Here’s one nice TEDTalk on why encryption is important for everyone and why breaking or weakening it – British Prime Minister David Cameron and US President Barack Obama are now pushing for a ban on encryption – is not a good idea. To put it bluntly and briefly, it is shooting our own foot.
This is bad news with far-reaching global implications – and it’s affecting not just only those based in China.
News has surfaced over the weekend that some foreign-based virtual private network (VPN) vendors found their services in China had been disrupted following a government crackdown – which the authorities labeled as an “upgrade” of its Internet censorship – to block the use of VPNs as a way to escape the so-called Great Firewall.
Many China-based internet users use VPNs to access external news sources but this is also bad news for companies and government offices based in China as well as anyone visiting the Chinese mainland – as many businessmen and executives use VPNs, as part of their company (and security) practice, on their business trips. Many foreigners and businesses residing in China also use VPNs for their day-to-day communications.
The VPNs provide an encrypted pipe between a computer or smartphone and an overseas server such that any communications would be channeled through the designated pipe, which effectively shield internet traffic from government filters that have set criteria on what sites can be accessed.
Find out more about this news below – And as China is fast moving beyond the “factories of the world” tag to become a global economic powerhouse and important trading partner to many developed and developing countries, this is one development to keep a close watch on.
The NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden revealed last week that he doesn’t use an iPhone because the Apple device has a secret surveillance spyware controlled by the US intelligence agency.
Blackberry’s CEO John Chen in his latest blog post “Encryption Needn’t Be An Either/Or Choice Between Privacy and National Security” responded to the recent push by British Prime Minister David Cameron – endorsed by US President Barack Obama last week – to ban encrypted communications in the name of national security:
Encryption Needn’t Be An Either/Or Choice Between Privacy and National Security
In the wake of the Paris terror attacks earlier this month, U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron proposed banning encrypted communications services such as those offered by Apple, Facebook and others. President Obama partially endorsed Prime Minister Cameron’s proposal a few days later, indicating he would support banning encrypted communications services that cannot be intercepted by law enforcement and national security agencies. While there is no publicly-available evidence that encrypted communications played any role in the Paris attacks, security officials say their ability to prevent future attacks will be hindered if terrorists are able to evade surveillance using encrypted communications and messaging services.
Privacy advocates have harshly criticized the Cameron-Obama proposals, arguing that encryption is a vital tool for protecting sensitive government, corporate and personal data from hacking and other forms of cyber theft. Following the recent spate of hacking attacks against Sony, Target, Home Depot, certain celebrity users of popular but hackable smartphones, and others, these advocates argue we need more, not less encryption. Further, they argue that banning encryption will not necessarily make it easier for security agencies to surveil terror plotters; after all, the terrorists will know they are being overheard and will simply communicate in new and ever-changing forms of coded language.
Reconciling these opposing perspectives on encryption requires a reasoned approach that balances legitimate national security concerns with legitimate cyber security concerns.
Privacy is Everyone’s Concern
Our dependence on computing devices for transmitting and storing sensitive personal information has become irreversible. Billions of items of personal information including health records, bank account records, social security numbers and private photographs reside on millions of computers and in the cloud. This information is transmitted via the internet every day. The same is true for highly confidential and proprietary business information. And of course no government or law enforcement agency could function without maintaining high levels of information security.
With so much information residing on computer networks and flowing through the internet, cyber security has emerged as one of society’s uppermost concerns. Protecting private and sensitive information from hacking, intrusion and exfiltration now commands the attention not just of computer professionals, but also heads of state, CEOs, Boards of Directors, small business owners, and every individual using a computer or smartphone, and even those who never use a computing device.
Modern forms of encrypting voice and data traffic provide the best protection for highly valuable and private personal, business and government information. Rendering data unreadable to the intruder greatly diminishes the incentive to hack or steal. Banning encryption, therefore, would dramatically increase the exposure of all such information to hacking and cyber theft. Clearly that is not a viable option.
Call of Duty
On the other hand, the same encryption technology that enables protection of sensitive data can also be abused by criminals and terrorists to evade legitimate government efforts to track their data and communications. Companies offering encrypted communications thus have a duty to comply with lawful requests to provide information to security agencies monitoring would-be terrorists. Companies like BlackBerry: We’ve supported FIPS 140-2 validated encryption in all of our devices for the past 10 years – longer than many of our competitors have been selling smartphones.
Depending on the particular technology involved, that information requested by law enforcement agencies might include the content of encrypted messages, but it may include other vital data such as user information, the dates and times the subscriber contacted other users, the length of such communications, the location of the user, and so forth. In many instances non-content user information can be even more important than the actual content itself, because such metadata can provide crucial leads and other vital intelligence to law enforcement and security agencies.
Let’s be clear: I am not advocating sharing data with governments for their ongoing data collection programs without a court order, subpoena or other lawful request. However, telecommunications companies, Internet Service Providers, and other players in the modern communications and messaging ecosystem need to take seriously their responsibility to comply and to facilitate compliance with reasonable and lawful requests for such information. Unfortunately, not all players in the industry view this issue the same way. Some Silicon Valley companies have publicly opposed government efforts to enable lawful surveillance and data gathering, even where lives may hang in the balance. These companies appear to be trying to position themselves as staunchly “pro-privacy,” without according sufficient weight to legitimate and reasonable governmental efforts to monitor and track would-be terrorists. Far from protecting privacy rights, this irresponsible approach risks providing ever stronger arguments to those who would subjugate all cyber privacy concerns to national security.
The answer, therefore, is not to ban encryption, because doing so would give hackers and cyber-criminals a windfall, making it much easier for them to mine billions of items of sensitive personal, business and government data. Instead, telecommunications and internet companies should cooperate with the reasonable and lawful efforts of governments to fight terrorism. That way we can help protect both privacy and lives.
US President Obama has openly voiced support to British Prime Minister’s idea about banning encryption but as The Guardian report (below) last week on a secret US cybersecurity document in 2009 showed, they are very well aware their decision would leave the entire world highly vulnerable to cyber attacks at the expense of their interest in national security and terrorism matters.
Secret US cybersecurity report: encryption vital to protect private data
Newly uncovered Snowden document contrasts with British PM’s vow to crack down on encrypted messaging after Paris attacks
A secret US cybersecurity report warned that government and private computers were being left vulnerable to online attacks from Russia, China and criminal gangs because encryption technologies were not being implemented fast enough.
The advice, in a newly uncovered five-year forecast written in 2009, contrasts with the pledge made by David Cameron this week to crack down on encryption use by technology companies.
In the wake of the Paris terror attacks, the prime minister said there should be no “safe spaces for terrorists to communicate” or that British authorites could not access.
Cameron, who landed in the US on Thursday night, is expected to urge Barack Obama to apply more pressure to tech giants, such as Apple, Google and Facebook, which have been expanding encrypted messaging for their millions of users since the revelations of mass NSA surveillance by the whistleblower Edward Snowden.
Cameron said the companies “need to work with us. They need also to demonstrate, which they do, that they have a social responsibility to fight the battle against terrorism. We shouldn’t allow safe spaces for terrorists to communicate. That’s a huge challenge but that’s certainly the right principle”.
But the document from the US National Intelligence Council, which reports directly to the US director of national intelligence, made clear that encryption was the “best defence” for computer users to protect private data.
Part of the cache given to the Guardian by Snowden was published in 2009 and gives a five-year forecast on the “global cyber threat to the US information infrastructure”. It covers communications, commercial and financial networks, and government and critical infrastructure systems. It was shared with GCHQ and made available to the agency’s staff through its intranet.
One of the biggest issues in protecting businesses and citizens from espionage, sabotage and crime – hacking attacks are estimated to cost the global economy up to $400bn a year – was a clear imbalance between the development of offensive versus defensive capabilities, “due to the slower than expected adoption … of encryption and other technologies”, it said.
An unclassified table accompanying the report states that encryption is the “[b]est defense to protect data”, especially if made particularly strong through “multi-factor authentication” – similar to two-step verification used by Google and others for email – or biometrics. These measures remain all but impossible to crack, even for GCHQ and the NSA.
The report warned: “Almost all current and potential adversaries – nations, criminal groups, terrorists, and individual hackers – now have the capability to exploit, and in some cases attack, unclassified access-controlled US and allied information systems.”
It further noted that the “scale of detected compromises indicates organisations should assume that any controlled but unclassified networks of intelligence, operational or commercial value directly accessible from the internet are already potentially compromised by foreign adversaries”.
The primary adversaries included Russia, whose “robust” operations teams had “proven access and tradecraft”, it said. By 2009, China was “the most active foreign sponsor of computer network intrusion activity discovered against US networks”, but lacked the sophistication or range of capabilities of Russia. “Cyber criminals” were another of the major threats, having “capabilities significantly beyond those of all but a few nation states”.
The report had some cause for optimism, especially in the light of Google and other US tech giants having in the months prior greatly increased their use of encryption efforts. “We assess with high confidence that security best practices applied to target networks would prevent the vast majority of intrusions,” it concluded.
Official UK government security advice still recommends encryption among a range of other tools for effective network and information defence. However, end-to-end encryption – which means only the two people communicating with each other, and not the company carrying the message, can decode it – is problematic for intelligence agencies as it makes even warranted collection much more difficult.
The latest versions of Apple and Google’s mobile operating systems are encrypted by default, while other popular messaging services, such as WhatsApp and Snapchat, also use encryption. This has prompted calls for action against such strong encryption from ministers and officials. Speaking on Monday, Cameron asked: “In our country, do we want to allow a means of communication between people which we cannot read?”
The previous week, a day after the attack on the Charlie Hebdo office in Paris, the MI5 chief, Andrew Parker, called for new powers and warned that new technologies were making it harder to track extremists.
In November, the head of GCHQ, Robert Hannigan, said US social media giants had become the “networks of choice” for terrorists. Chris Soghoian, principal senior policy analyst at the American Civil Liberties Union, said attempts by the British government to force US companies to weaken encryption faced many hurdles.
“The trouble is these services are already being used by hundreds of millions of people. I guess you could try to force tech companies to be less secure but then they would be less secure against attacks for anyone,” he said.
GCHQ and the NSA are responsible for cybersecurity in the UK and US respectively. This includes working with technology companies to audit software and hardware for use by governments and critical infrastructure sectors.
Such audits uncover numerous vulnerabilities which are then shared privately with technology companies to fix issues that could otherwise have caused serious damage to users and networks. However, both agencies also have intelligence-gathering responsibilities under which they exploit vulnerabilities in technology to monitor targets. As a result of these dual missions, they are faced with weighing up whether to exploit or fix a vulnerability when a product is used both by targets and innocent users.
The Guardian, New York Times and ProPublica have previously reported the intelligence agencies’ broad efforts to undermine encryption and exploit rather than reveal vulnerabilities. This prompted Obama’s NSA review panel to warn that the agency’s conflicting missions caused problems, and so recommend that its cyber-security responsibilities be removed to prevent future issues.
Another newly discovered document shows GCHQ acting in a similarly conflicted manner, despite the agencies’ private acknowledgement that encryption is an essential part of protecting citizens against cyber-attacks.
The 2008 memo was addressed to the then foreign secretary, David Miliband, and classified with one of the UK’s very highest restrictive markings: “TOP SECRET STRAP 2 EYES ONLY”. It is unclear why such a document was posted to the agency’s intranet, which is available to all agency staff, NSA workers, and even outside contractors.
The memo requested a renewal of the legal warrant allowing GCHQ to “modify” commercial software in violation of licensing agreements. The document cites examples of software the agency had hacked, including commonly used software to run web forums, and website administration tools. Such software are widely used by companies and individuals around the world.
The document also said the agency had developed “capability against Cisco routers”, which would “allow us to re-route selected traffic across international links towards GCHQ’s passive collection systems”.
GCHQ had also been working to “exploit” the anti-virus software Kaspersky, the document said. The report contained no information on the nature of the vulnerabilities found by the agency.
Security experts regularly say that keeping software up to date and being aware of vulnerabilities is vital for businesses to protect themselves and their customers from being hacked. Failing to fix vulnerabilities leaves open the risk that other governments or criminal hackers will find the same security gaps and exploit them to damage systems or steal data, raising questions about whether GCHQ and the NSA neglected their duty to protect internet systems in their quest for more intelligence.
A GCHQ spokesman said: “It is long-standing policy that we do not comment on intelligence matters. Furthermore, all of GCHQ’s work is carried out in accordance with a strict legal and policy framework, which ensures that our activities are authorised, necessary and proportionate, and that there is rigorous oversight, including from the secretary of state, the interception and intelligence services commissioners and the parliamentary intelligence and security committee.“All our operational processes rigorously support this position. In addition, the UK’s interception regime is entirely compatible with the European convention on human rights.”
Michael Beckerman, president and CEO of the Internet Association, a lobby group that represents Facebook, Google, Reddit, Twitter, Yahoo and other tech companies, said: “Just as governments have a duty to protect to the public from threats, internet services have a duty to our users to ensure the security and privacy of their data. That’s why internet services have been increasing encryption security.”
In the aftermath of the recent Charlie Hebdo attacks, it came as no surprise politicians were quick to up the antenna (again) on surveillance and stifle the right to privacy – whilst, in the same breath, they drape themselves publicly in Paris to embrace free speech and press freedom.
British Prime Minister David Cameron, for example, stole the headlines this week saying that, if re-elected in May, he would ban encrypted online messaging apps like WhatsApp and Snapchat if the British intelligence agencies were not given backdoors to access the communications.
“We must not allow terrorists safe space to communicate with each other,” said Cameron as he spoke about a “comprehensive piece of legislation” to close the “safe spaces” used by suspected terrorists – and also planned to encourage US President Barack Obama (who should be reminded that he has promised to pursue NSA reforms) to make internet companies like Facebook and Twitter cooperate with British intelligence agencies to track the online activities of Islamist extremists.
Backdoors are by and large security holes and what Cameron is proposing would set a dangerous precedence with irreversible consequences far beyond the loss of free speech – this is best summed up in the following open letter to David Cameron (below – and here):
In what looks like the opening salvo in response to the major cyberattack on Sony Pictures Entertainment, the United States slapped North Korea with a new round of sanctions last Friday when President Obama signed an Executive Order authorizing the imposition of sanctions and designated 3 entities and 10 individuals for being agencies or officials of the North Korean government.
According to a Treasury Department statement:
The identifiers of these 10 individuals are:
But the US government knew sanctions have had limited impact on the Hermit Kingdom. The new sanctions might be deemed as swift and decisive measures in some quarters but it is really nothing more than a window-dressing of sorts – much like animating a gun with one’s fingers under a coat as a first warning at best. Consider, for example, what kind of impact should one expect from these new sanctions anyway? The 3 organizations were already on the US sanctions list and the 10 North Koreans are highly unlikely to have assets in the US, at least not under their name.
In any case, the horizon ahead of 2015 is likely to be proliferated with more headlines about catastrophic data breaches.
And the Sony cyberattack actually pale in comparison to other data breaches on record, as shown (below) by independent data journalist and information designer David McCandless – you can also click on the bubbles to find out about these cases shown in the chart and table nicely compiled and presented in his blog.
Photo above: Rafael Hui (right) and Donald Tsang (left)
My last post of the year below and also in AsiaSentinel.
Photo above: Rafael Hui
Why Didn’t the HK Vetting System Find Raphael Hui?
Former chief secretary, on his way to jail for 7-1/2 years, should have been spotted by background checks
Written by Vanson Soo
WED,24 DECEMBER 2014
The Hong Kong High Court delivered a landmark ruling Tuesday that brought an end to a chapter of one of the highest-level corruption trials in the city’s history with the conviction of former Chief Secretary Raphael Hui for bribery, along with the two executives who bribed him. But one serious question lingers.
Hui was handpicked by then Hong Kong chief executive Donald Tsang to return to the civil service as chief secretary. Why didn’t the background checks turn up what was obviously a grotesquely opulent lifestyle?
The 131-day high-profile trial involving Hui, effectively the number two in the Hong Kong government hierarchy, and two tycoons of Sun Hung Kai, the world’s second-most valuable real estate company according to Bloomberg, drew effective closure with Hui receiving seven and a half years behind bars for five charges including taking HK$8.5 million (US$1.1 million) in bribes from Sun Hung Kai co-chairman Thomas Kwok, who was given a five-year sentence and fined HK$500,000 for conspiring to corrupt the former chief secretary.
But who would have dared to oppose Hui’s appointment during the vetting process if Tsang wanted him? Apparently nobody. And shouldn’t Tsang be held responsible for overlooking Hui’s (known) vices? Shouldn’t the system have counted on the chief executive as the last line of defense to be absolutely clean?
If pre-employment background checks found a lavish opulent lifestyle and a high-spending propensity that were well known among Hui’s peers, who cast aside the potential red flag as merely a private and personal matter? Wasn’t it a colossal mistake that nobody asked the very simple question, if he was spending well beyond his means, where was he getting the money? Who then should be responsible for the gross oversight?
Details of Hui’s high life, including the showering of expensive gifts on his high-maintenance young mistress, came to light during the trial but it also emerged that his tilt towards the material world was no secret among his associates.
In light of Hui’s case, the government has defended its system of background checks, insisting there were adequate checks in place prior to slotting civil servants into their appointments. That defense highlights one gross, systematic problem, such as pre-employment background checks, in both the civil and commercial sectors alike: a check-the-box mentality instead of a serious investigation.
Pre-employment background checks are an exercise to ensure someone is properly, thoroughly and systematically vetted before an official undertaking, such as employment or appointment, to the extent that the person doesn’t become a potential liability and cause embarrassment sometime down the way.
These checks have both quantitative and qualitative elements. On the quantitative side, the checks include paper trials to confirm (thus the tag “check-the-box”) personal details, educational background, career history and highlight any potential conflicts and red flags found – for example, any record of bankruptcy, insolvency, sanctions, political affiliations, criminal history, etc.
In the civil service, all those checks extend to the subject’s next-of-kin. In commercial background checks (for example, banks in some jurisdictions are required to conduct these checks on all new hires), any personal stake and interest in other companies would also be material information.
The qualitative checks refer to efforts to find, as the wording suggests, any non-quantitative (i.e. non-documented) facts that could potentially cause trouble. In some commercial checks I have done for my clients, for example, someone found to have a high gambling propensity, or another with a history of sexual harassment in the workplace, were duly noted and accounted for in the process. In the political sphere, for example, anyone found to have employed undocumented immigrants would be promptly flagged in the United States and has been, ending the careers of several high-level appointees.
The check-the-box exercise underscores the very bureaucracy of the civil service as these background checks are designed to be “on the safe side,” documenting only those facts that are “traceable and reliable,” according to a source, a former senior Hong Kong government official familiar with the background checks and vetting processes within the civil service.
Beyond these quantifiable facts, the source told me any adverse comments – such as reports of one’s character, much like Hui’s high life – would rarely be passed on in the reports because they would be easily challenged. In several instances, troubles emerged later precisely because these omitted qualitative red flags came back to haunt both the employers and the newly employed.
The point then is, so what if Hui is known to have those vices? The government can boast all they want about their rigorous system of checks, including having two referees to evaluate the candidate but what use is it when the referees were appointed by the candidates themselves?
In Hui’s case, he was handpicked by Tsang to return to the civil service as chief secretary. But it has been widely reported that Tsang himself could face criminal prosecution on charges of improper conduct in office although the city’s anti-graft body – the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) – only says its investigation is still underway.
So, was it not a colossal mistake by the civil service to assume poor Hui and companies wouldn’t be singing Christmas carols behind bars, this and several more Christmas ahead?
The Washington Post article below once again highlights one approach to mobile phone usage: have many spares, apart from your regular smartphone(s), like good old cellulars and disposable low-value SIM cards. Dispose the SIM card after each use and always switch amongst those cellulars.
It can’t stop eavesdropping but at least the hackers and spies cannot trace you so easily. The approach may sound extreme to most people, so for all practical reasons, it’s best recommended only for those important and confidential conversations.
German researchers discover a flaw that could let anyone listen to your cell calls.
By Craig Timberg December 18
German researchers have discovered security flaws that could let hackers, spies and criminals listen to private phone calls and intercept text messages on a potentially massive scale – even when cellular networks are using the most advanced encryption now available.
The flaws, to be reported at a hacker conference in Hamburg this month, are the latest evidence of widespread insecurity on SS7, the global network that allows the world’s cellular carriers to route calls, texts and other services to each other. Experts say it’s increasingly clear that SS7, first designed in the 1980s, is riddled with serious vulnerabilities that undermine the privacy of the world’s billions of cellular customers.
The flaws discovered by the German researchers are actually functions built into SS7 for other purposes – such as keeping calls connected as users speed down highways, switching from cell tower to cell tower – that hackers can repurpose for surveillance because of the lax security on the network.
Those skilled at the myriad functions built into SS7 can locate callers anywhere in the world, listen to calls as they happen or record hundreds of encrypted calls and texts at a time for later decryption. There also is potential to defraud users and cellular carriers by using SS7 functions, the researchers say.
These vulnerabilities continue to exist even as cellular carriers invest billions of dollars to upgrade to advanced 3G technology aimed, in part, at securing communications against unauthorized eavesdropping. But even as individual carriers harden their systems, they still must communicate with each other over SS7, leaving them open to any of thousands of companies worldwide with access to the network. That means that a single carrier in Congo or Kazakhstan, for example, could be used to hack into cellular networks in the United States, Europe or anywhere else.
“It’s like you secure the front door of the house, but the back door is wide open,” said Tobias Engel, one of the German researchers.
Engel, founder of Sternraute, and Karsten Nohl, chief scientist for Security Research Labs, separately discovered these security weaknesses as they studied SS7 networks in recent months, after The Washington Post reported the widespread marketing of surveillance systems that use SS7 networks to locate callers anywhere in the world. The Post reported that dozens of nations had bought such systems to track surveillance targets and that skilled hackers or criminals could do the same using functions built into SS7. (The term is short for Signaling System 7 and replaced previous networks called SS6, SS5, etc.)
The researchers did not find evidence that their latest discoveries, which allow for the interception of calls and texts, have been marketed to governments on a widespread basis. But vulnerabilities publicly reported by security researchers often turn out to be tools long used by secretive intelligence services, such as the National Security Agency or Britain’s GCHQ, but not revealed to the public.
“Many of the big intelligence agencies probably have teams that do nothing but SS7 research and exploitation,” said Christopher Soghoian, principal technologist for the ACLU and an expert on surveillance technology. “They’ve likely sat on these things and quietly exploited them.”
The GSMA, a global cellular industry group based in London, did not respond to queries seeking comment about the vulnerabilities that Nohl and Engel have found. For the Post’s article in August on location tracking systems that use SS7, GSMA officials acknowledged problems with the network and said it was due to be replaced over the next decade because of a growing list of security and technical issues.
The German researchers found two distinct ways to eavesdrop on calls using SS7 technology. In the first, commands sent over SS7 could be used to hijack a cell phone’s “forwarding” function — a service offered by many carriers. Hackers would redirect calls to themselves, for listening or recording, and then onward to the intended recipient of a call. Once that system was in place, the hackers could eavesdrop on all incoming and outgoing calls indefinitely, from anywhere in the world.
The second technique requires physical proximity but could be deployed on a much wider scale. Hackers would use radio antennas to collect all the calls and texts passing through the airwaves in an area. For calls or texts transmitted using strong encryption, such as is commonly used for advanced 3G connections, hackers could request through SS7 that each caller’s carrier release a temporary encryption key to unlock the communication after it has been recorded.
Nohl on Wednesday demonstrated the ability to collect and decrypt a text message using the phone of a German senator, who cooperated in the experiment. But Nohl said the process could be automated to allow massive decryption of calls and texts collected across an entire city or a large section of a country, using multiple antennas.
“It’s all automated, at the push of a button,” Nohl said. “It would strike me as a perfect spying capability, to record and decrypt pretty much any network… Any network we have tested, it works.”
Those tests have included more than 20 networks worldwide, including T-Mobile in the United States. The other major U.S. carriers have not been tested, though Nohl and Engel said it’s likely at least some of them have similar vulnerabilities. (Several smartphone-based text messaging systems, such as Apple’s iMessage and Whatsapp, use end-to-end encryption methods that sidestep traditional cellular text systems and likely would defeat the technique described by Nohl and Engel.)
In a statement, T-Mobile said: “T-Mobile remains vigilant in our work with other mobile operators, vendors and standards bodies to promote measures that can detect and prevent these attacks.”
The issue of cell phone interception is particularly sensitive in Germany because of news reports last year, based on documents provided by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden, that a phone belonging to Chancellor Angela Merkel was the subject of NSA surveillance. The techniques of that surveillance have not become public, though Nohl said that the SS7 hacking method that he and Engel discovered is one of several possibilities.
U.S. embassies and consulates in dozens of foreign cities, including Berlin, are outfitted with antennas for collecting cellular signals, according to reports by German magazine Der Spiegel, based on documents released by Snowden. Many cell phone conversations worldwide happen with either no encryption or weak encryption.
The move to 3G networks offers far better encryption and the prospect of private communications, but the hacking techniques revealed by Nohl and Engel undermine that possibility. Carriers can potentially guard their networks against efforts by hackers to collect encryption keys, but it’s unclear how many have done so. One network that operates in Germany, Vodafone, recently began blocking such requests after Nohl reported the problem to the company two weeks ago.
Nohl and Engel also have discovered new ways to track the locations of cell phone users through SS7. The Post story, in August, reported that several companies were offering governments worldwide the ability to find virtually any cell phone user, virtually anywhere in the world, by learning the location of their cell phones through an SS7 function called an “Any Time Interrogation” query.
Some carriers block such requests, and several began doing so after the Post’s report. But the researchers in recent months have found several other techniques that hackers could use to find the locations of callers by using different SS7 queries. All networks must track their customers in order to route calls to the nearest cellular towers, but they are not required to share that information with other networks or foreign governments.
Carriers everywhere must turn over location information and allow eavesdropping of calls when ordered to by government officials in whatever country they are operating in. But the techniques discovered by Nohl and Engel offer the possibility of much broader collection of caller locations and conversations, by anyone with access to SS7 and the required technical skills to send the appropriate queries.
“I doubt we are the first ones in the world who realize how open the SS7 network is,” Engel said.
Secretly eavesdropping on calls and texts would violate laws in many countries, including the United States, except when done with explicit court or other government authorization. Such restrictions likely do little to deter criminals or foreign spies, say surveillance experts, who say that embassies based in Washington likely collect cellular signals.
The researchers also found that it was possible to use SS7 to learn the phone numbers of people whose cellular signals are collected using surveillance devices. The calls transmit a temporary identification number which, by sending SS7 queries, can lead to the discovery of the phone number. That allows location tracking within a certain area, such as near government buildings.
The German senator who cooperated in Nohl’s demonstration of the technology, Thomas Jarzombek of Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union party, said that while many in that nation have been deeply angered by revelations about NSA spying, few are surprised that such intrusions are possible.
“After all the NSA and Snowden things we’ve heard, I guess nobody believes it’s possible to have a truly private conversation on a mobile phone,” he said. “When I really need a confidential conversation, I use a fixed-line” phone.
Think you have taken all measures to remain anonymous and untraceable online? Or are you still (unknowingly) leaving browser fingerprints that can be traced to you and your devices?
The good news is, there’s a way to check and confirm if you are unique in cyberspace.
A browser fingerprint, or device fingerprint, is the systematic collection of information about a remote device for identification purposes, even when cookies are turned off.
There’s a web site “Am I Unique” which you can visit and check by clicking “View my browser fingerprint” as shown below:
That should give much food for thoughts for the Christmas holidays?
According to a recent international survey on 23,376 Internet users in 24 countries, carried out between October 7, 2014 and November 12, 2014, which found some 64 percent confessed they’re more concerned today about online privacy than they were a year ago.
That’s one way to gauge the post-Snowden effects. And if you still wonder why privacy matters, I highly recommend the Glenn Greenwald’s TEDTalk on “Why Privacy Matters“.
Guess one would easily assume privacy does not apply in public areas – just look at the proliferation of CCTV cameras in the streets.
Well, that’s probably not necessarily the case judging by one recent court ruling in Washington. It may be good news for the general public and bad news for law enforcement.
Now first, many would probably associate the following 2 photos with typical covert surveillance operations, whereby operatives waited patiently to snap photos (and video) evidence of their subjects.
But in this case involving the Washington police and Leonel Vargas (an “undocumented” immigrant suspected of drug trafficking), the authorities had a better idea.
The police planted a video camera, without a warrant, on a nearby utility pole 100 yards from Vargas’ rural Washington state house and shot 6 weeks worth of footage of his front yard whereby they eventually captured convincing evidence.
Vargas challenged the case on the grounds of violation of his privacy, which the government argued was not valid as his front yard is a public space and thus privacy does not apply.
Law enforcement’s warrantless and constant covert video surveillance of Defendant’s rural front yard is contrary to the public’s reasonable expectation of privacy and violates Defendant’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search. The video evidence and fruit of the video evidence are suppressed.
I’m troubled by the Sydney siege at the Lindt Chocolate Café in Martin Place that has just concluded with 3 fatalities and 3 injured.
For starters, here’s one easy question: What’s wrong with these pictures (above from 7 News and the 2 below) and the video below (watch from 2:06 onwards)?
Now, the real question is: Where were the snipers? And why didn’t they shoot when they had the chance?
If the media had these clear shots of the gunman Man Haron Monis, why didn’t the authorities have the snipers to take him down within the 16 hours window? If the snipers were not in a better position than the media, surely they have enough time to move for better views, rooftop or on the ground? The snipers of course need clearance from their commanders who should be on site with their squads. So does that mean the authorities did not want to kill him for whatever reasons?
Certainly many complicated questions but in any case, there were 17 hostages at stake and the police did not move in for the kill until (negotiations apparently failed and) there were gunshots within the café?
I have only one potential explanation: the authorities were concerned with the hostage taker’s claims that there were other explosive devices planted around the city – and the police have intelligence that he has comrades who would trigger those devices if he’s dead (I know it’s easier said than done but with good use of negotiators and intelligence, and a good 16-hour timeframe, the police and intelligence agencies could have established if he has other accomplices to detonate those devices, if any – plus it’s not that Man Haron Monis was any stranger to the Australian authorities. They should have a huge file on him all along).
Anything short (and as it turned out, his former lawyer, Manny Conditsis, reportedly told the media that Monis was an isolated figure who had acted alone), it’s sad to see yet another case whereby the authorities have not followed protocol in hostage situations: Take the man down (at the very opportunity).
It’s reminiscent of the Manila hostage event of 23 August 2010, when the hostage taker, former Philippines police officer Rolando Mendoza, hijacked a tourist bus with 25 hostages onboard. He was in plain sight (see picture below) several times, more than sufficient for the snipers to decide where to aim. But the Philippines authorities missed the opportunities, resulting in 9 deaths (including the perpetrator).
A longer version of this column appears in AsiaSentinel.com
The following video has CIA Director John Brennan defending the agency in wake of torture report at CIA headquarters (full speech here).
Photo (above) credit: CIA
I like to share this POLITICO MAGAZINE exclusive interview with former CIA Director (May 30, 2006 – February 12, 2009) Michael Hayden on the release of the US Senate’s report.
Michael Hayden Is Not Sorry
The Senate report rakes Bush’s former CIA director over the coals. He fires back in an exclusive interview.
By MICHAEL HIRSH
December 09, 2014
Though the CIA’s “enhanced interrogation” program long predated his takeover of the agency in 2006, former Director Michael Hayden has found himself at the center of the explosive controversy surrounding the Senate Intelligence Committee’s executive summary of its still-classified report on torture. In a long, impassioned speech on the floor Tuesday, Committee Chair Dianne Feinstein cited Hayden’s testimony repeatedly as evidence that the CIA had not been forthright about a program that the committee majority report called brutal, ineffective, often unauthorized “and far worse than the CIA represented to policymakers and others.” She publicly accused Hayden of falsely describing the CIA’s interrogation techniques “as minimally harmful and applied in a highly clinical and professional manner.” In an interview with Politico Magazine National Editor Michael Hirsh, Hayden angrily rebuts many of the report’s findings.
Michael Hirsh: The report concludes, rather shockingly, that Pres. George W. Bush and other senior officials—including Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld for a time and Secretary of State Colin Powell—were not aware of many details of the interrogation programs for a long period. According to CIA records, it concludes, no CIA officer including Directors George Tenet and Porter Goss briefed the president on the specific enhanced interrogation techniques before April 2006. Is that true?
Michael Hayden: It is not. The president personally approved the waterboarding of Abu Zubaydah [in 2002]. It’s in his book! What happened here is that the White House refused to give them [the Senate Intelligence Committee] White House documents based upon the separation of powers and executive privilege. That’s not in their report, but all of that proves that there was dialogue was going on with the White House. What I can say is that the president never knew where the [black] sites were. That’s the only fact I’m aware that he didn’t know.
Hirsh: The report directly challenges your truthfulness, repeatedly stating that your testimony on the details of the programs –for example on whether the interrogations could be stopped at any time by any CIA participant who wanted them halted— is “not congruent with CIA records.” Does that mean you weren’t telling the truth?
Hayden: I would never lie to the committee. I did not lie.
Hirsh: Does it mean that you, along with others at senior levels, were misled about what was actually going on in the program?
Hayden: My testimony is consistent with what I was told and what I had read in CIA records. I said what the agency told me, but I didn’t just accept it at face value. I did what research I could on my own, but I had a 10-day window in which to look at this thing [the committee’s request for information]. I was actually in Virginia for about 30 hours and studied the program for about three before I went up to testify. I was trying to describe a program I didn’t run. The points being made against my testimony in many instances appear to be selective reading of isolated incidents designed to prove a point where I was trying to describe the overall tenor of the program. I think the conclusions they drew were analytically offensive and almost street-like in their simplistic language and conclusions. The agency has pushed back rather robustly in its own response.
Hirsh: You seem upset.
Hayden: Yeah, I’m emotional about it. Everything here happened before I got there [to the CIA], and I’m the one she [Sen. Feinstein] condemns on the floor of the Senate? Gee, how’d that happen? I’m the dumb son of a bitch who went down and tried to lay out this program in great detail to them. I’m mentioned twice as much in there as George Tenet—but George and Porter Goss had 97 detainees during their tenure, while I had two.
Hirsh: Is there anything you think the report gets right?
Hayden: All of us are really upset because we could have used a fair and balanced review of what we did. … The agency clearly admits it was fly-by-wire in the beginning. They were making it up as they went along and it should have been more well-prepared. They’ve freely admitted that. They said that early on they lacked the core competencies required to undertake an unprecedented program of detaining and interrogating suspected terrorists around the world. But then what the committee does is to take what I said out of context. They take statements I made about the later days of the program, for example when I said it was well-regulated and there were medical personnel available, etc., and then apply it to the early days of the program, when there were not. It misrepresents what I said.
Hirsh: One of the most stunning and cited conclusions of the report is that interrogations of CIA detainees were brutal and far worse than the CIA represented to policymakers and others.
Hayden: That is untrue. And let me give you a data point. John Durham, a special independent prosecutor, over a three-year period investigated every known CIA interaction with every CIA detainee. At the end of that the Obama administration declined any prosecution. [In 2012, the Justice Department announced that its investigation into two interrogation deaths that Durham concluded were suspicious out of the 101 he examined—those of Afghan detainee Gul Rahman and Iraqi detainee Manadel al-Jamadi—would be closed with no charges.] So if A is true how does B get to be true? If the CIA routinely did things they weren’t authorized to do, then why is there no follow-up? I have copies of the DOJ reports they’re using today. The question is, is the DoJ going to open any investigation and the DoJ answer is no. You can’t have it both ways. You can’t have all this supposed documentary evidence saying the agency mistreated these prisoners and then Barack Obama’s and Eric Holder’s Department of Justice saying no, you’ve got bupkis here.
Hirsh: What about the report’s overarching conclusion that these enhanced techniques simply were not effective at getting intelligence?
Hayden: My very best argument is that I went to [then-Deputy CIA Director] Mike Morell and I said, ‘Don’t fuck with me. If this story [about the usefulness of intelligence gained from enhanced techniques] isn’t airtight then I’m not saying it to Congress.’ They came back and said our version of the story is correct. Because of this program Zubaydah begat [Khalid Sheikh Mohammed], who begat [others]. We learned a great deal from the detainees.
Hirsh: The report says that even the CIA’s inspector general was not fully informed about the programs—that in fact the CIA impeded oversight by the IG.
Hayden: The IG never told me that. The IG never reported that to Congress. Look, I’m relying on people below me. If they tell you an untruth, you get rid of them. But I never felt I was being misled, certainly not on the important contours of this program. What they [the committee] are doing is grabbing emails out of the ether in a massive fishing expedition. This is a partisan report, as you can see from the minority report out of the committee.
Hirsh: Can you sort out the discrepancy between your testimony that there were only 97 detainees in the history of the program when the report says there 119?
Hayden: We knew there were more. The high-value-target program—they don’t show up on my list if they’re at the [black] sites. And committee knew all about that. They have chapter and verse from [former CIA IG John] Helgerson about it. It’s a question of what criteria you use. When I met with my team about these discrepancies, I said, ‘You tell [incoming CIA director] Leon Panetta he’s got to change the numbers that have been briefed to Congress.’
Hirsh: The report suggests that you misrepresented what you told Congress in the briefings, telling a meeting of foreign ambassadors to the United States in 2006 that every committee member was “fully briefed.”
Hayden: I mean what are they doing—trying to score my public speeches? What’s that about? You want me to go out and score Ron Wyden’s speeches?
Hirsh: You don’t believe you’re in legal jeopardy?
Hayden: No, not at all. I didn’t do anything wrong. How could I be in legal jeopardy?
Michael Hirsh is national editor for Politico Magazine.
In view of the huge trove of news coverage following the release of the long overdue and highly anticipated CIA Interrogation report (the BBC has a nice summary of the 20 key findings) by the US Senate Intelligence Committee on Tuesday, I thought it is good to (re)view this UK’s Channel 4 “Guantanamo Handbook” documentary.
It is a reenactment of the tortures at one of the most well known US military prisons in Cuba called the Guantanamo Bay detention camp, also referred to as Guantánamo, G-bay or GTMO – whereby 7 British volunteered to be detainees and subjected to selected CIA-style tortures for 48 hours.
Most notably, one volunteer who started off saying he supported the torture program as a means to gather intelligence and save lives – as per White House speaks – was the first to withdraw on medical grounds after just 10 hours, saying even though he had “strong views” earlier, he has “become more sympathetic of what’s going on there than before” and felt lucky he was “pulled” (out of the program).
Action speaks louder than words? Period.
Photo (Above) Credit: CNBC
It’s time to raise the antenna again on smartphone encryption matters.
Law enforcement agencies, particularly the FBI, have been desperately pressurizing the Congress to force Apple and Google to do away with their new default smartphone encryption. And authorities are apparently giving in.
According to an exclusive report by Ars Technica (below) earlier this week, court documents from 2 federal criminal cases in New York and California show the US Department of Justice on October 31 this year went as far as exercising a 18th century law – the All Writs Act – to compel Apple and at least one other company to cooperate with law enforcement officials in investigations dealing with locked and encrypted smartphones.
The 225-year-old law gives the courts the right to issue whatever writs or orders in order to compel someone to do something.
To the extent that Apple has recently beefed up encryption in its latest iOS 8, the fact that the DOJ would go to such absurd lengths might set worrying precedence – recall a recent ludicrous DOJ assertion that the new encryption standards would kill a child.
A more disturbing question: What would you do if you were FBI director James Comey making his rounds to denounce smartphone encryption?
Make the DOJ use the All Writs Act to force manufacturers to install convenient backdoors. Why not?
Feds want Apple’s help to defeat encrypted phones, new legal case shows
Prosecutors invoke 18th-century All Writs Act to get around thorny problem.
by Cyrus Farivar – Dec 1 2014, 10:00pm CST
OAKLAND, CA—Newly discovered court documents from two federal criminal cases in New York and California that remain otherwise sealed suggest that the Department of Justice (DOJ) is pursuing an unusual legal strategy to compel cellphone makers to assist investigations.
In both cases, the seized phones—one of which is an iPhone 5S—are encrypted and cannot be cracked by federal authorities. Prosecutors have now invoked the All Writs Act, an 18th-century federal law that simply allows courts to issue a writ, or order, which compels a person or company to do something.
Some legal experts are concerned that these rarely made public examples of the lengths the government is willing to go in defeating encrypted phones raise new questions as to how far the government can compel a private company to aid a criminal investigation.
Two federal judges agree that the phone manufacturer in each case—one of which remains sealed, one of which is definitively Apple—should provide aid to the government.
Ars is publishing the documents in the California case for the first time in which a federal judge in Oakland specifically notes that “Apple is not required to attempt to decrypt, or otherwise enable law enforcement’s attempts to access any encrypted data.”
The two orders were both handed down on October 31, 2014, about six weeks after Apple announced that it would be expanding encryption under iOS 8, which aims to render such a data handover to law enforcement useless. Last month, The Wall Street Journal reported that DOJ officials told Apple that it was “marketing to criminals” and that “a child will die” because of Apple’s security design choices.
Apple did not immediately respond to Ars’ request for comment.
Meet the “All Writs Act”
Alex Abdo, an attorney with the American Civil Liberties Union, wondered if the government could invoke the All Writs Act to “compel Master Lock to come to your house and break [a physical lock] open.”
“That’s kind of like the question of could the government compel your laptop maker to unlock your disk encryption?” he said. “And I think those are very complicated questions, and if so, then that’s complicated constitutional questions whether the government can conscript them to be their agents. Then there’s one further question: can the government use the All Writs Act to compel the installation of backdoors?”
But, if Apple really can’t decrypt the phone as it claims, the point is moot.
“Then that’s pretty much the end of it,” Hanni Fakhoury, a staff attorney at the Electronic Frontier Foundation, told Ars. “The writ doesn’t require Apple to do something that is impossible for it to do.”
Andrew Crocker, a legal fellow also at the Electronic Frontier Foundation, pointed out on Twitter on Tuesday that back in 2005, a different New York magistrate refused to accept the government’s invocation of the All Writs Act to obtain real-time cell site data.
As Magistrate Judge James Orenstein wrote at the time:
Thus, as far as I can tell, the government proposes that I use the All Writs Act in an entirely unprecedented way. To appreciate just how unprecedented the argument is, it is necessary to recognize that the government need only run this Hail Mary play if its arguments under the electronic surveillance and disclosure statutes fail.
The government thus asks me to read into the All Writs Act an empowerment of the judiciary to grant the executive branch authority to use investigative techniques either explicitly denied it by the legislative branch, or at a minimum omitted from a far-reaching and detailed statutory scheme that has received the legislature’s intensive and repeated consideration. Such a broad reading of the statute invites an exercise of judicial activism that is breathtaking in its scope and fundamentally inconsistent with my understanding of the extent of my authority.
“Any capabilities [Apple] may have to unlock the iPhone”
One of the new phone search cases was filed in federal court in Oakland, just across the bay from San Francisco, while another was filed in federal court in Manhattan.
In the Oakland case, prosecutors asked a federal judge in to “assist in the execution of a federal search warrant by facilitating the un-locking of an iPhone.”
Ars went in person to the Oakland courthouse on Wednesday to obtain the documents and is publishing both the government’s application and the judge’s order for the first time here. The All Writs Act application and order are not available via PACER, the online database for federal court records.
“This Court has the authority to order Apple, Inc., to use any capabilities it may have to unlock the iPhone,” Garth Hire, an assistant US attorney, wrote to the court and cited the All Writs Act.
“The government is aware, and can represent, that in other cases, courts have ordered the unlocking of an iPhone under this authority,” he wrote. “Additionally, Apple has routinely complied with such orders.”
“This court should issue the order because doing so would enable agents to comply with this Court’s warrant commanding that the iPhone be examined for evidence identified by the warrant,” he continued. “Examination of the iPhone without Apple’s assistance, if it is possible at all, would require significant resources and may harm the iPhone. Moreover, the order is not likely to place any unreasonable burden on Apple.”
In response, Magistrate Judge Kandis Westmore ordered that Apple “provide reasonable technical assistance to enable law enforcement agents to obtain access to unencrypted data.” She did not specifically mention the All Writs Act.
But she added:
It is further ordered that, to the extent that data on the iOS device is encrypted, Apple may provide a copy of the encrypted data to law enforcement but Apple is not required to attempt to decrypt, or otherwise enable law enforcement’s attempts to access any encrypted data.
Westmore’s language is a near-duplicate of a June 6, 2014 order issued by a different judge from the Northern California district, San Jose division, which is about 40 miles south of Oakland. There, Magistrate Judge Howard Lloyd ordered Apple to assist in the search of an iPad Mini, months before the release of iOS 8.
New spying tools afoot
On Tuesday, The Wall Street Journal reported on an order issued by a federal magistrate in New York in a case involving alleged credit card fraud.
In that Manhattan case, Magistrate Judge Gabriel Gorenstein granted the government’s proposed order on the same day as Westmore (October 31, 2014), also citing the All Writs Act, which compels the unnamed phone manufacturer to provide “reasonable technical assistance” in unlocking the device.
The mystery company could challenge the judge’s order, according to Brian Owsley, a former federal magistrate judge who now is a law professor at Indiana Tech.
“Unfortunately, we will probably not know because the issue will likely be sealed even though there should be more transparency in these issues,” he told Ars by e-mail, noting that during his tenure on the bench he could not remember a time when the government invoked the All Writs Act.
“It is only through greater transparency will we start to get the answers. If the provider simply complies we will know nothing. Here, Judge Gorenstein’s approach strikes me as very even-handed, but the inherent problem is that those who are concerned about privacy issues in general simply have to hope that the provider will speak up for us.”
But Orin Kerr, a law professor at George Washington University and a former federal prosecutor, does not believe that the seized phone in the New York case was an iOS 8 device.
“The government obtained a warrant on October 10 for a phone already in its possession,” he told Ars by e-mail. “Apple’s announcement was something like September 18. If it was an iPhone, it was probably an iPhone running [on] an earlier operating system.”
Still, Alex Abdo, the ACLU attorney, after reading a copy of the Oakland documents, concluded that the “government’s application raises troubling questions about the extent to which it can force companies to break the products they sell.”
“We are heartened, however, that the court recognized that possibility and stopped short of ordering Apple to come up with a way to decrypt its customers’ data,” he added.
“More broadly, it is disconcerting that the government is relying on a catch-all law to seek surveillance powers that it should be seeking from Congress and the public,” said Abdo. “If the government wants new spying tools, it should allow our democratic process to debate them openly first.”
UPDATE 1:50pm CT: Jonathan Mayer, a lecturer at Stanford Law, said that use of the All Writs Act is not as novel as it may seem. (He recommended his recent lecture on the subject!)
“The TL;DR is that there is nothing new about using the All Writs Act to compel assistance,” Mayer told Ars by e-mail. “And there is also nothing new about using it to compel assistance with unlocking a phone. That repeated language you saw? It’s provided by Apple itself!”
“As for the opinion discounting the All Writs Act, that had to do with surveillance under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. Where ECPA applies, the All Writs Act doesn’t. (It’s just a default, as the court rightly noted.) Phone unlocking isn’t covered by ECPA, so the All Writs Act remains in play.”
Photo (above) Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wZ68ZQhzwPs
I like to share with you this interview on the new book by James Risen, the two-time Pulitzer Prize-winning New York Times investigative reporter at the center of one of the most significant press freedom cases in decades who exposed the warrantless wiretapping of Americans by the National Security Agency as early as 2005, 8 years before the Snowden revelations. Risen also hit headlines after being on Obama’s blacklist after he was threatened with prison terms by the Justice Department for refusing to reveal the source of one of his stories.
And here is the transcript from The Intercept.
I saw this Sky News clip earlier this week and thought I should share it. The 2 opposing views illustrate how these arguments could go on forever. But which side are you on?
Above from Sky News: The Campaign Director of the Don’t Spy On Us campaign, Mike Harris and the Director of the Centre for Security and Intelligence Studies at the University of Buckingham, Professor Anthony Glees discuss whether the UK needs more anti-terror laws.
Fancy rolling up your sleeves and doing something about the (continued) intrusions of your privacy and communications? Now here’s your chance.
The US Senate was just 2 votes shy last Tuesday on the USA Freedom Act, a surveillance reform bill which would have otherwise put a (legal) stop to the National Security Agency’ clandestine domestic surveillance programs and metadata collection as revealed by the Snowden revelations.
Here is a list of the senators and their respective votes:
And here’s a list of those 42 senators that voted NAYs – ie. they support more NSA surveillance – along with their social media handles so you can send them a personal Twitter message. Reckon they wouldn’t mind at all since they don’t value privacy, or respect your privacy to be precise. Besides it’s only their contact coordinates disclosed. Tell them how you feel about losing more than your contact coordinates, ie. your metadata and privacy. And share it with your friends, they may have something to tell those senators. So why are you waiting?
And here’s one to highlight:
It’s a fitting scene from the classic movie Gone with the Wind with the famous closing quote “Frankly, my dear, I don’t give a damn”.
The US Senate vote on the USA Freedom Act Tuesday night to rein in the NSA spying power came shy of just 2 votes of the 60 needed to take up the legislation, which would have otherwise stopped the controversial phone record metadata collection by the NSA
Any hope will now hinge on June next year as the legal grounds for the NSA phone snooping, as revealed by the Snowden revelations, under the Patriot Act will then expire – which means the NSA would require then new legislation to justify their access to these mass data.